Date: 13/12/2022

Relevance: GS-2: Bilateral, regional and global grouping involving India, Significance of Indo-Pacific for India etc.

Key Phrases: China Test, principal contradiction, secondary contradictions, India-U.S. relations, re-engage southern Asia, Sino-Russian cooperation, smart balancing China in Southern Asia, American engagement of Pakistan.

Why in news?

• The concept of a principal contradiction — one that poses the most intense challenge to an individual/organisation, and has the power to shape its future choices and consequent outcomes — is a useful method of optimising and prioritising strategic decision-making.
• Principal contradiction: China is contemporary India’s principal strategic contradiction.
• Secondary contradictions: Every other challenge, be it Pakistan, internal insurgencies, and difficulties in relations with its neighbours, fall in the category of secondary contradictions.

Elements of the ‘China Test’:

• From an operational point of view, the ‘China test’ consists of three distinct elements.
  • First, an assessment of how a certain Indian decision or a specific regional development squares with Chinese regional strategy or interests.
  • Second, an assessment of whether India’s decision or a certain regional development would require India to make modifications at the level of secondary contradictions.
  • Third, an assessment of whether this would require any major policy changes internally.

India-U.S. relations:

• New Delhi has had a complicated relationship with Washington which is increasingly getting normalised and interests-driven.
• Despite its withdrawal from the region, Washington is seeking to re-engage southern Asia (Pakistan, South Asia in general, the Indo-Pacific, and perhaps even the Taliban).
• It appears that one of the lessons New Delhi learnt from the standoff with China along the Line of Actual Control in 2020 was that it was perhaps a consequence of India’s growing proximity to the U.S.

What would a ‘China test’ of India-U.S. relations suggest?

• Given that Beijing seeks to dominate the region, it is clearly not in its interest to see an American re-engagement of the region or growing India-U.S. proximity.
• If so, the lack of/lukewarm India-U.S. strategic engagement in the region is precisely what would help Beijing’s long-term objectives.
• A China test would suggest that New Delhi should not give in to the short-term temptation of not being on the wrong side of China given its long-term implications.
• While the fears of such a relationship irking China may not be entirely unjustified, they invariably play into the Chinese strategy of boxing India in the region.

Does the ‘China test’ require India to pacify its relationship with Pakistan?

• For China, the best-case scenario is India vigorously preoccupied with Pakistan which ensures that India is not focused on the growing threat from China, thereby providing Beijing with the opportunity to displace traditional Indian primacy in South Asia.
• So, for India, a course correction on Pakistan, even if it is only posted facto, is a strategically sensible one.

What should be India’s objective in South Asia?

• What India should actively seek is not a balance of power in South Asia with Pakistan but a balancing of Chinese power in Southern Asia.
• Hence, India’s objective in South Asia should be to seek a pacification of conflicts with Pakistan, so that it can focus on China.
• U.S.- Pakistan engagement:
  • Similarly, India need not oppose the American engagement of Pakistan for the same reason — it helps prevent Pakistan from going into the China camp completely.
  • A Pakistan engaged with the U.S. and the West is better for India than a Pakistan shunned by the U.S. and the West.

The Russia connection:

• The U.S. and its allies would like India to stop engaging with Moscow and condemn its aggression against Ukraine — which India has refused to do so far.
• In return, there is on offer greater accommodation of Indian interests including perhaps diplomatic and political support against Chinese aggression.
• There is also the growing proximity between Moscow and Beijing which reduces the robustness of India-Russia relations.
• India-Russia relations are on the wane, there is a strong rationale for New Delhi to continue its relationship with Moscow — which is China.

Implications of India’s break away from Russia:

• Strengthened Sino-Russian cooperation:
  • In the absence of an India-Russia relationship, the extent of Sino-Russian cooperation is likely to strengthen, and India will be cut out of the continental space to its north and west.
• Possible change of beneficiary for different benefits:
  • New Delhi continues to get discounted energy, cheaper defence equipment (even if some of it has to be retrofitted with more sophisticated technology from elsewhere), and support at the United Nations Security Council, and Moscow has been understanding of New Delhi’s ‘political sensitivities’ more than its western partners.
  • If India decides to break away from Russia, many of these could come to a grinding halt, and the natural beneficiary of such an eventuality will, undoubtedly, be China.
  • This could also push Moscow towards Pakistan with or without some nudging from Beijing.
• China’s free hand in central Asia:
  • It is also important to note that Moscow is not keen to have China dominate the strategic space around it and has been keen to balance the growing influence of China in Central Asia with partners such as New Delhi.
  • New Delhi’s turn away from Moscow will ensure that China gets a free hand in Central Asia too.

Conclusion:

• For New Delhi, the message from the China test is a rather straightforward one — smart balancing China in Southern Asia and beyond must form a key element in India’s grand strategic planning and decision-making.

Source: The Hindu

Mains Question:

Q. “Smart balancing China in Southern Asia and beyond must form a key element in India’s grand strategic planning and decision making”. Critically examine.