Date: 09/05/2023

Relevance: GS-2: Bilateral, Regional and Global Groupings and Agreements involving India and/or affecting India’s interests; Effect of Policies and Politics of Developed and Developing Countries on India’s interests.

Key Phrases: G-20, Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO), Modernization, Samarkand Declaration, Secure and Stable, Trade Relations, Constructivist Approach, Indian Ocean Region, Emerging Economies, Global Development Initiative, Group of Friends.

Context:

• The year 2023 marks an important step in India’s diplomacy, with its presidentship of the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) and the G-20.
  • But it should not blind us to the persisting challenges the nation faces, due to a concatenation of circumstances.
  • Therefore, It must tone down the high expectations that are being generated of reaping a rich dividend from helming the two summits.

Key Highlights:

• China International Development Cooperation Agency (CIDCA) organized the Indian Ocean Region Forum.
  • High-level representatives from 19 countries, including Indonesia, Pakistan, Myanmar, Sri Lanka, Bangladesh, Maldives, Nepal, Afghanistan, Iran, Oman, South Africa, Kenya, Mozambique, Tanzania, Seychelles, Madagascar, Mauritius, Djibouti, and Australia except India, were invited for China-Indian Ocean Region Forum.
  • Australia and Maldives did not participate in the Indian Ocean Region Forum convened by China.

Potential challenges for India:

• Global Peace:
  • Global peace is nowhere in sight with India holding the reins.
    • Instead, everything points to a further deterioration in the geo-political climate and to a distinct possibility of impending conflict.
  • Priorities listed by India as signifying its presidency such as climate change, clean energy, sustainable developmental programmes and reform of multilateral institutions, are likely to take a back seat, given the deteriorating global situation.
  • Consequently, hopes of reaping a rich dividend from the summitry may be misplaced.
• Declining importance of G20:
  • India needs to be aware that the importance of the G-20 appears to be declining in today’s world.
    • The SCO seems to have somewhat greater traction.
  • During its presidency of the two institutions, India may well be called upon to chart a course that balances the contradictory demands of the G-20 and the SCO - and even more so that of the Global South.
    • All this leaves little room for grandstanding, and India should proceed with caution.
• Two Camps and distrust:
  • Distrust between the two camps led by the United States and China/Russia, respectively, leaves little scope for countries such as India- that have not declared their allegiance to either camp — any room for manoeuvre.
  • Ukraine presents a spectacle of possessing substantial quantities of sophisticated modern weaponry, on the other side, Russia is also receiving equipment and material from its allies.
    • The two sides are positioning themselves to demonstrate which set of modern weaponry is superior.
    • Therefore, a single misstep could well unleash a catastrophic battle.
  • Apart from U.S. and European nations such as Germany, many nations elsewhere are participating in what is turning out to be Europe’s war with a global impact.
• Issues with China:
  • There are several issues of deepening concern for India, including how to deal with a rampaging China which is currently on a major diplomatic-cum-strategic offensive across Asia.
    • This is further accompanied by a display of its naval prowess in the seas around much of East and Southeast Asia, and a flexing of its military muscle in the Ladakh and Arunachal sectors of the Sino-Indian border.
  • This is only likely to reduce room for manoeuvre on India’s part, at a time when China is launching several other regional initiatives to checkmate India in the Indian Ocean region, for example, the China-Indian Ocean Region Forum which has seen participation by an overwhelming majority of Indian Ocean states.
  • Unlike India (which seeks to limit the conflict with China to border issues), China is seeking to widen the arc of conflict with India.
    • Currently China is targeting India for going closer to the U.S. and the western bloc, for its partnership in the Quad (India, Australia, Japan, the U.S.), as well as its participation in maritime surveillance exercises with the U.S, Japan and Australia.
  • China is also actively engaged in seeking new friends in India’s extended neighborhood, in a bid to limit India’s influence in this region.
    • West Asia, once a region where India’s influence was preponderant, appears to be fast yielding to China’s muscular and diplomatic offensive.
    • The new China brokered Iran-Saudi Arabia entente is setting the stage for major diplomatic shifts across the region, marginalizing India and certain other nations.
  • India is not unaware of China’s hostile intentions overall.
    • It is well aware of China’s ability to embark on hybrid warfare, including the adoption of cyber tactics, engage in the ‘politics of water’ by redirecting the Himalayan rivers, and adapting to modern conditions the tactics popularized by the Fifth Century BCE Chinese Strategist, Sun Tzu, of ‘winning wars without fighting through avoiding the enemy’s strength and attacking his weaknesses’.
• The neighborhood Relations:
  • Other turmoils in India’s immediate neighborhood in South Asia, compound India’s problems.
  • The situation in Afghanistan appears to be steadily worsening.
    • India has lost all traction with the Taliban in Afghanistan.
  • Pakistan and Sri Lanka, to different degrees, represent ‘worst case’ scenarios.
• Uncertainty with Russia:
  • India’s relations with Russia also appear to be entering a prolonged phase of uncertainty.
  • Russian ties are not necessarily anchored in defense cooperation, but this has been a key factor in cementing their relations.
    • As India looks more to the West, specially the U.SFor state-of-the-art weaponry, the inevitability of the relationship can no longer be guaranteed.
  • With the Russia-China strategic relationship getting stronger and both countries openly giving vent to their belief in the utility of such a relationship, strains are inevitable in India-Russia relations.
  • Russia’s unequivocal attack on the Quad during the SCO Defence Ministers meeting in New Delhi recently, is a pointer to the winds of change that are becoming evident.
  • In the meantime, other pacts involving Russia, such as the Tripartite Russia-India-China platform and BRICS, have lost much of their dynamism.
  • The economic content of the bilateral relationship is limited, and for the present linked to trading in oil, imparting little dynamism to the relationship.

Conclusion:

• While India is one of the few countries in the world which has managed to emerge from the COVID-19 pandemic and the resultant economic crisis without much damage, and is widely seen as a prospective global power, it has much to do before it attains this pinnacle.
• There are many obstacles that have to be overcome before India can achieve its predetermined goal.
• Well before this, and notwithstanding its fortuitous position of helming both the G-20 and SCO simultaneously, India should not claim to have attained its goal.

Source: The Hindu

Mains Question:

Q. What are the persisting challenges India facing currently due to a concatenation of circumstances? Also, suggest some measures to overcome these issues. (250 Words).