Context-

The intensifying confrontation between Russia and the West, exacerbated by the ongoing Russia-Ukraine conflict, has reshaped Moscow's foreign policy. A central aspect of this transformation is Russia’s “Pivot to the East” strategy, which has become critical in light of sanctions imposed by the United States (US) and the European Union (EU). The Indo-Pacific region is increasingly vital to Russia’s political and economic development, particularly as it seeks to deepen relations with key powers in this region. 

Russia's Foreign Policy Shift: Pivot to the East

●     In response to Western sanctions, Russia has prioritized its relations with Asia, notably China and India. The "Pivot to the East" strategy signifies a major departure from Russia’s traditional Euro-Atlantic focus. According to the 2023 revision of Russia’s foreign policy, the Asia-Pacific region has ascended from seventh place in 2016 to fourth place. Meanwhile, the Eurasian continent, with a particular emphasis on China and India, is now ranked third.

●     This strategic shift underlines the growing importance of China and India as reliable partners, both of which have largely resisted aligning with the US-led sanctions regime against Russia. However, despite the importance of these relationships, Moscow remains wary of the Indo-Pacific concept, which it views primarily as an American initiative aimed at containing China. Russia perceives groupings like the Quad and AUKUS as Asian equivalents of NATO, reinforcing the US strategy to counterbalance Beijing’s influence.

Russia-China Relations: Limited Cooperation Amid Strategic Necessity

●     Russia's deepening ties with China have become central to its Indo-Pacific strategy, particularly as both nations share a common dissatisfaction with US dominance and the promotion of "liberal values." However, their cooperation is primarily driven by economic pragmatism rather than robust political alignment. China, as Russia’s largest trading partner, has benefitted from purchasing discounted Russian oil and expanding into Russia's automotive market. Bilateral trade reached $240 billion by 2024, bolstered by increased energy transactions.

●     Yet, there are clear limitations to this partnership. China’s export-driven economic model makes it cautious about becoming too entangled in the Russia-West confrontation, particularly given the risks of secondary sanctions. This concern has led Chinese banks to limit their dealings with Russia, especially in terms of providing yuan for foreign trade. Furthermore, China’s reluctance to support Russia’s claims over the Northern Sea Route (NSR) and gas pricing disputes illustrate that while the two nations share some strategic interests, a formal military-political alliance remains unlikely.

The Russia-North Korea Renaissance: A New Strategic Frontier

●     Moscow's recent engagement with North Korea marks a significant shift in its Indo-Pacific strategy. In June 2024, Russia and North Korea signed a Comprehensive Strategic Partnership Treaty, which includes military cooperation, a move that breaks from Russia's previous adherence to UN sanctions against Pyongyang. The treaty, which contains provisions for North Korean support in the Ukraine conflict, could significantly alter the balance of power in East Asia. However, the extent of North Korea’s involvement in the conflict, whether through the deployment of troops or labor, remains uncertain.

●     While this partnership enhances Russia's influence in East Asia, it could strain relations with China, North Korea’s primary ally. Beijing is unlikely to welcome Pyongyang’s growing ties with Moscow, especially if they undermine China’s own influence over North Korea.

Arctic Policy: Linking the NSR to Asia

●     Russia’s 2023 foreign policy revision also emphasizes the importance of the Arctic, positioning it above the Asia-Pacific in terms of strategic priority. Russia seeks to integrate the NSR with its broader Eurasian economic initiatives, linking it to key maritime routes in East, Southeast, and South Asia. However, the NSR project faces significant challenges. Russia’s suspension from the Arctic Council and its limited production capacities hinder progress on the project, making the participation of China and India essential.

●     China, however, views the NSR differently. It sees the route as part of its broader Polar Silk Road initiative, a component of the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), and has shown little enthusiasm for Russia’s claims over the route. Meanwhile, India’s potential involvement in the NSR through the Chennai-Vladivostok Eastern Maritime Corridor offers Moscow an alternative avenue for cooperation in the Indo-Pacific.

Russia-India Partnership: Navigating Sanctions and Geopolitical Pressures

●     The Russia-India relationship, designated as a "Special and Privileged Strategic Partnership," is a cornerstone of Moscow's Indo-Pacific strategy. Bilateral trade surged to $65 billion in 2023, driven largely by discounted Russian hydrocarbon supplies. Russia became India’s largest oil supplier during this period, providing economic benefits to New Delhi, including $10 billion in savings. However, India, like China, remains cautious about risking secondary sanctions in its financial transactions with Russia. This hesitation has led to delays in payments, with reports indicating that nearly $40 billion in payments for Russian oil were held in Indian accounts. Despite these challenges, the resumption of energy transactions in 2024 indicates progress in resolving this issue.

●     While the Russia-India partnership remains robust, it is increasingly constrained by India’s growing ties with the US. As Russia aligns more closely with China, India gravitates towards the US, particularly in areas such as military-technical cooperation and foreign direct investment. This dynamic complicates the potential for broader Russia-India cooperation, especially in traditional sectors like defense.

De-hyphenation in the Indo-Pacific: Balancing China and India

●     As Russia seeks to deepen its ties with both China and India, it faces the challenge of balancing these relationships within the broader Indo-Pacific context. The rivalry between China and India, particularly their border disputes and strategic competition, complicates Russia’s efforts to maintain equilibrium. Nonetheless, Russia remains committed to fostering multipolarity in the region, as evidenced by Prime Minister Modi’s visit to Moscow in July 2024.

●     Despite the ongoing Russia-Ukraine conflict and the likelihood of long-term Western sanctions, Russia’s "Pivot to the East" is set to become a defining feature of its foreign policy. Moscow's strategy emphasizes cooperation with "friendly countries" in Asia, even as sanctions hinder progress on certain projects. However, a de-hyphenation approach—where Russia simultaneously deepens relations with China, India, and North Korea—may offer a way forward for Moscow in navigating the complexities of the Indo-Pacific region.

Conclusion

Russia’s Indo-Pacific strategy reflects its broader effort to adjust to a shifting geopolitical landscape, where Western sanctions have forced it to look eastward for economic and political partners. While Russia’s relations with China and India are central to its foreign policy, these partnerships are fraught with challenges, from economic constraints to geopolitical rivalries. The evolving nature of Russia’s engagement with key Indo-Pacific powers, along with its Arctic ambitions and burgeoning ties with North Korea, underscores the complexity of Moscow’s efforts to carve out a new role in the region. As the Indo-Pacific continues to emerge as a focal point of global power dynamics, Russia’s ability to balance its relations with China, India, and other regional players will be crucial to its long-term success in the region.

Source- ORF