Date: 03/01/2023

Relevance: GS-2: India and its neighborhood relations.

Relevance: GS-3: Security challenges and their management in border areas.

Key Phrases: Line of Actual Control, salami-slicing, Sino-Indian border dispute, Aksai Chin, McMahon Line in Arunachal Pradesh, rules of engagement (ROE), offensive capabilities, dual command and control mechanism, Kailash Range style.

Why in News?

• Recently, after fifteen days of the salami-slicing attempt in Yangtse (Tawang), the Chinese foreign minister, Wang Yi, declared that “China and India have maintained communication through the diplomatic and military channels and both countries are committed to upholding stability in the border areas”.
• However, Wang Yi gave no explanation for the PLA(People’s Liberation Army) intrusions which have gone on regularly for over two decades.

Key Highlights:

• Ease in occupation of disputed territory through the salami-slicing tactics, which had long been considered no man’s land, is the main reason for PLA intrusions.
• Placing blocks on the routes which were regularly patrolled by India is the first sign of salami-slicing tactics.
• Since 2020, these intrusions have become more violent have resulted in brawls, scuffles and the use of crude, lethal sticks between the PLA and Indian soldiers.
• A huge deployment of men and material
• China strengthened its deployments on the Line of Actual Control (LAC) in Eastern Ladakh, leading to its part-occupation of Depsang Plains and salami-slicing attempts in the Galwan valley, Pangong Tso area and a few other locations.
• These deployments have been supplemented by over 60,000 fully armed troops on the LAC, equipped for a conventional war.
• At many locations, these deployments are in eyeball to eyeball situations.

What five changes should India make to strengthen its position across LAC vis-a-vis China?

1. The rules of engagement (ROE) should be reviewed:
   • China has repeatedly flouted all five agreements on LAC/border issues, signed with India since 1993.
   • Today, there is neither peace nor tranquility on the LAC.
   • Only the Indian army follows the ROE more seriously, no sign of similar seriousness from the PLA.
   • It is high time to review ROE and the Indian soldier on duty should be given more power of offensive capabilities rather than defensive only.
   • Indian soldiers should be allowed to fire if, despite warning, the adversary continues to advance toward our position.
2. India can review its LAC perceptions:
   • Why does India continue to use terms like “our” and “their” perceptions of the LAC?
   • The Chinese do not use the terminology of perception in their statements. In fact, it gives them a handle to continue with their aggression activities as happened post Galwan.
   • India must give out our version of the LAC subject to a final resolution of the boundary dispute with China.
3. Strengthening of intelligence and surveillance:
   • Intelligence is a nation’s first line of defence.
   • Indian surveillance structure, is a critical constituent of safety, security and also grand strategy.
   • In the kind of terrain where the military is operating, it is almost impossible to defend “every inch of territory”.
   • Thus, India needs reliable and timely information to mobilise adequate forces where the adversary is expected to strike or intrude.
4. Done away with dual command and control mechanism:
   • The Western and Central sectors of the LAC are guarded by the Indo-Tibetan Border Patrol (ITBP) backed by the army.
   • However, ITBP and the army both work under different ministries.
   • Despite several discussions, there is no unified command and control, which often leads to a lack of coordination, responsibility and accountability.
   • The ITBP units deployed on the LAC need to be placed under the operational control of the army.
5. Strengthening of offensive capabilities of Indian army:
   • During training, India diligently inculcates and imbibes an offensive spirit in the Indian military.
   • And yet, most of the time, India expects the military to remain defensive and passive on the border.
   • The need is that India’s frontline military formations should not only be capable of defending intrusions but also plan and be prepared to retaliate proactively — Kailash Range style — taking advantage of the high altitude mountainous terrain.

Way Forward:

1. Improve military infrastructure:
   • India should be engaged in improving its border military infrastructure.
2. Political and diplomatic talks should be prioritized for expected “disengagement” of troops whenever intrusions happen.
3. Strengthening of round-the-clock, high level of intelligence, all-weather surveillance capabilities and assessments for the troops on the ground.
4. Learn from the past mistakes:
   • In 2020, despite satellite imagery, high altitude UAVs and availability of a host of modern surveillance equipment, India failed to assess and react to the Chinese troops’ movements in Eastern Ladakh.
   • Indian intelligence and surveillance structure along the northern border requires urgent focus and improvement wherever gaps exist.

Source: Indian Express

Mains Question:

Q. In recent years, there are rising incidences of incursions and salami-slicing tactics along the LAC( Line of Actual Control). How far do you think that the Indian government needs to review its diplomatic and military strategy to effectively withstand aggressive China? Give reasons in support of your answers. ( 15 marks).