Relevance: GS-3: Role of external state and non-state actors in creating challenges to internal security

Key Phrases: Statecraft, internal security, Jammu and Kashmir, Maoist, Naxalism, Khalistan movement, Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE), United Liberation Front of Asom–Independent (ULFA-I), National Socialist Council of Nagalim (I-M)

Why in News?

• The war in Europe, involving Russia and Ukraine — with Kyiv being backed by western powers and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) — and the political turmoil in South Asia have pushed the debate on India’s internal security problems on the backburner.
• This is unfortunate, for many long-standing security problems have a propensity to wax and wane and seldom seem to go away.

Limitations of a Security Vigil

• Lack of long-term solutions: While the country’s security agencies do maintain a tight vigil, what is seldom realised is that security agencies can only deal with the immediate threat. Long-term solutions require the use of statecraft.
  • Additional doses of security, in an emergency, are at best a temporary solution. This does not amount to problem-solving.
  • To change the mindsets of both the authorities and those challenging the existing order, it may be first necessary to admit that more and more security has its limitations.
• New age warfare: The forces threatening the state have lately become nimbler in adopting new technologies and modes of warfare.

Need of Statecraft:

• In many countries, both the authorities and security agencies are beginning to acknowledge the importance of resorting to statecraft as a vital adjunct to the role played by the security agencies.
• Statecraft involves fine-grained comprehension of inherent problems; also, an ability to quickly respond to political challenges.
• It further involves strengthening the ability to exploit opportunities as they arise, and display a degree of political agility rather than leaving everything to the security agencies.
• It entails a shift from reposing all faith in the security establishment to putting equal emphasis on the implementation of policies and programs.
• In effect, it shifts the emphasis to formulating strategies that favour political deftness, strength, and agility, after the initial phase.

MAJOR INTERNAL SECURITY PROBLEMS:

Upheaval in Kashmir:

• Long-term problem: While Jammu and Kashmir has been a troubled region ever since 1947, the situation has metamorphosed over the years — at times tending to become extremely violent followed by spells of near normalcy. No proper solution has emerged to a long-standing problem.
• Revocation of Article 370: Political angst over the revocation of Article 370 of the Constitution is possibly one of the reasons for local support being available for the current crop of Jammu and Kashmir militants.
• Cross Border Backing: A majority of them are believed to be home-grown militants, though backed by elements from across the border in Pakistan.
• Return of Kashmiri Pandits: Irrespective of the reasons for the latest upsurge in violence, what is evident is that Jammu and Kashmir has again become the vortex of violence, specialising currently in targeted killings of outsiders, mainly Kashmiri Pandits.
  • Migrant Kashmiri Pandits returning to Jammu and Kashmir have, no doubt, been given certain concessions, including government jobs. This might have acted as a provocation.
• Targeted Killings of Police Personnel: The targeted killings of police personnel, many of whom were on duty while some others were on leave.
• Infiltration in Official Machinery: Information filtering out of government vaults suggests that terrorists may have infiltrated the official machinery.
  • They also appear to have access to data banks of the police and security agencies. All this is leading to an atmosphere of uncertainty.
• Threat to Amarnath Yatra: Concerns exist that this year’s Amarnath Yatra (beginning end of June) could well be one of the targets of the militants.
  • If this were to happen, it might well result in a crescendo of violence, leading to large-scale upheaval across Kashmir.
• Ineffectiveness of Doctrine of Containment: Evidently, the doctrine of containment pursued by the Jammu and Kashmir police and security agencies is not having the desired effect.
  • Security analysts believe that a sizeable segment of the new cadres fall into what they perceive as ‘unpredictable’, and this further aggravates the situation.
  • The history of Jammu and Kashmir is replete with instances where a sizeable presence of such ‘unpredictable’ elements has tilted the scale in favour of greater violence.
• One size doesn’t fit all: What is also disturbing is that strategies intended for one set of militants can seldom be applied to newer elements, making it more difficult to contain the spread of violence.
• No All-In-One Grand Strategy: In Jammu and Kashmir there is ‘no all-in-one grand strategy’ to deal with the situation. The missing ingredient is statecraft which alone can walk in step with the changing contours of a long-standing problem.

The Maoist shadow:

• Strong ideological underpinnings: Of all the strands of the militancy in India, Maoists or Naxalites stand apart as being the only ones with strong ideological underpinnings.
• Mindless violence: Notwithstanding its ideological veneer, Maoists/Naxalites nevertheless tend to indulge in mindless violence carrying out brutal killings.
  • The combination of ideological ideation and brutal killings has often confused and confounded the police, intelligence, and security establishments of the States and the Centre. In that sense, the Maoists represent the biggest challenge to the idea of India.
• Less prominent leaders: The original Maoist leaders in Bengal, Andhra Pradesh, and Kerala (in the late 1960s and early 1970s) were inspired by Charu Mazumdar who talked of a ‘Spring Thunder over India’ (followed by his claim to have lit a spark to initiate a ‘prairie fire’) has since been replaced by lesser leaders with few ideological pretensions.
• No peaceful dialogue: While railing against the use of State violence, and from time to time displaying a willingness to hold peace talks with both the State and Central governments, the Maoists have seldom displayed a commitment to peaceful ways.
• Readily available new supporters: Due to its ideological foundation, new supporters are readily available, further confusing authorities who tend to claim that ‘that Maoism is on its last legs.
• Louder Reach of Demands: More than any other militant or violent movement in the country, curbing the Maoist menace will require considerable doses of statecraft, as many of the purported demands of the Maoists find an echo among intellectuals in the cities and the ‘poorest of the poor in the rural areas.

Revival of a pro-Khalistan movement in Punjab:

• The resurgence of militancy by pro-Khalistan groups in Punjab, which could spill over into Haryana and Himachal Pradesh.
• The recent discovery of ‘sleeper cells’ in Punjab indicates the potential for the revival of a pro-Khalistan movement - which once ravaged large parts of Punjab.
• While the pro-Khalistani sentiment is present in pockets in the United Kingdom and Europe, it has not been in evidence in India for some time.
• Hence, the recent attack by pro-Khalistan elements on the headquarters of the Punjab Police Intelligence wing in Mohali was a rude shock to the security establishment.
• The incident appeared to be like a warning shot ‘across the bow’ by the Babbar Khalsa International, which has the backing of Pakistan’s Inter-Services Intelligence — a reminder that militancy in Punjab has not been permanently extinguished, and will need deft statecraft to nip it in the bud.

North-eastern Militancy:

• In India’s northeast, more specifically in the States of Assam and Nagaland, there are again incipient signs of trouble which, for the present, may need the use of statecraft rather than the security forces.
• Assam: In Assam, the United Liberation Front of Asom–Independent (ULFA-I) is trying to revive its activities after a long spell of hibernation.
  • Currently, the ULFA-I operates from Myanmar, and its fortunes have been on a steady decline in the past decade. However, the latest reports indicate that ULFA-I has embarked on a recruitment drive which will need to be curbed before matters get out of hand.
• Nagaland: Likewise in Nagaland, where the National Socialist Council of Nagalim (I-M) has recently initiated a fresh push for a solution to the ‘Naga political issue’, the situation is pregnant with serious possibilities.
• Both instances merit the use of statecraft so that the situation does not get out of hand.

Revival of LTTE-sponsored militancy in Southern India:

• In the South, intelligence and police officials appear concerned about a likely revival of Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE)-sponsored activities in Tamil Nadu.
• This stems from a possible revival of LTTE-sponsored militancy in Sri Lanka following the recent economic crises and uncertainty there.
• Security agencies in India believe that an attempt could be made to reach out to elements in Tamil Nadu to revive the spirit of the 1980s. This situation again needs deft statecraft to prevent a resurgence of the past.

Conclusion:

• Hence, it should be evident that statecraft is critical in finding lasting solutions to a host of problems that continue to afflict India.
• India faces several challenges today, but the answer to this is neither grand strategy nor grand simplifications nor resort to higher doses of security.
• India must navigate its way through a complex set of circumstances and situations, and suitably manage crises that might otherwise undermine peace and stability.
• A properly structured set of policies, having liberal doses of statecraft in addition to a proper set of security measures, is the best answer to India’s needs, now and in the future.

Source: The Hindu

Mains Question:

Q. How can deft statecraft be the solution that the resurgence of internal security challenges requires rather than higher doses of security?