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India might be deceiving itself by believing that China will limit its actions to "grey-zone operations" along the Sino-Indian border, avoiding an all-out war. This assumption, while comforting, could be dangerous.

Assessing the Current Situation

With the conclusion of the 2024 parliamentary elections, it is time to evaluate India's ongoing boundary confrontation with the People's Republic of China (PRC). Despite Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s conciliatory statement urging for peace and tranquillity along the contested boundary, territorial disputes hold the potential for full-fledged war, and the India-China relationship is no exception.

Many within the strategic community believe that a massive attack by the PRC against India will never happen. A former Indian envoy to the PRC recently observed, “There is a pattern of aggressive behaviour [from China], of trying to change the status quo [against India and in the South China Sea (SCS)] through salami slicing, incremental steps by staying short of an all-out military conflict and changing ground realities.” While this view is not incorrect, salami slicing and incremental gains are just some possibilities, and a massive attack and full-scale war remain potential threats.

Lessons from History

India experienced the worst-case scenario with the outbreak of the Sino-Indian War in 1962. Krishna Menon, Defence Minister during the 1962 war, ruefully admitted, “I make no secret of the fact that we were not prepared for a war [massive attack] against China…We expected negotiation and diplomacy to play their part [not war].” Civil-military tensions, especially under Indian Army Chief General Thimmaya, arose due to the latter's acute awareness of the China threat and his warnings that the Nehru-led leadership was not paying enough attention to China’s military strength and the possibility of a massive attack.

Before the 1962 conflict, Nehru believed that the superpowers would restrain China, preventing a Sino-Indian War. The Nehru government assumed that limited military measures would suffice and that China would not want war with India because it could trigger a world war. This belief was based on the assumption that India was too critical to the balance of power for the Cold War superpowers—the United States (US) and the Soviet Union—to allow such a conflict. They believed that the Soviets would restrain the Chinese.

Nehru’s leadership inferred too much from the limited skirmishes along the Sino-Indian boundary, such as those in Longju and Kongka Pass, and assumed these would be the extent of Chinese military conduct. However, these deeply held beliefs were shattered in October 1962 when the People's Liberation Army (PLA) launched a massive attack.

The 1962 Sino-Indian War

In the Eastern sector, or the Northeast Frontier Agency (NEFA), the PLA overran Indian Army defences, nearly reaching the outskirts of Guwahati. They killed thousands of Indian soldiers and took several thousand prisoners of war (POW). The Chinese unilaterally withdrew their forces behind the McMahon Line, which saved India in the Eastern sector, now called Arunachal Pradesh. In the Western sector, the Indian Army performed better due to better-built defences and logistics capabilities. These were the only consolatory outcomes for India from the humiliating war.

Improvements and Continuing Challenges

India has significantly improved its logistics, airfields, all-weather roads, and capabilities for the Indian Army (IA) since 1962. However, China’s capabilities, including air defences, air bases, heliports, and logistics along the Sino-Indian boundary and the Tibetan Autonomous Region (TAR), have also improved considerably.

There is a widespread consensus in India that a massive attack will not be executed by the PRC, with the latter confining itself to seizing territory in Eastern Ladakh, as seen in April-May 2020, the bloody Galwan clash in June 2020, and the attempted seizure of Yangtse in December 2022. This view rests on the assumption that China has already made its intended territorial gains and that a limited attack is more likely than a massive one.

Economic and Military Preparedness

India might be falling prey to the same level of deception as before, believing that China will restrict itself to “grey-zone operations” and avoid all-out war. This assumption, while comforting, could be potentially damaging.

The Interim Budget tabled before Parliament shows that defence spending is inadequate to meet the shortfall in capabilities the Indian Armed Forces currently face. Constraints on military spending have been exacerbated by supply bottlenecks due to the ongoing Russia-Ukraine war, with the Indian Air Force (IAF) unable to spend its allocations from last year’s full budget. In any potential Sino-Indian boundary war, the IAF will play a pivotal role, and if inadequately equipped due to military supply constraints, New Delhi will need to move away from reliance on Russian military hardware, weapons, and spares.

The Role of International Alliances

India’s reliance on Russian military hardware only compounds its supply problem. There is also a presumption that an outright war triggered by China will catalyse US intervention on India’s behalf. This assumption is highly conditional. Washington intervened and extended military aid to India only after the Nehru-led government sought it in late October 1962. In the event of a Sino-Indian War today, US intervention may happen if India solicits American military assistance or may not happen even after India seeks aid. There is neither automaticity nor inevitability to the extension of American military aid to India because Washington may choose not to intervene due to its commitments to Israel, Ukraine, and its East Asian allies in the Indo-Pacific.

Strategic Recommendations

History illuminates the realities India confronts today against China. Now that the Modi government has been re-elected to a third term, it is time to prioritize defence spending, especially on capital acquisitions, and to develop a broader defence roadmap to tackle the China challenge on the military front.

Conclusion

In conclusion, while India has made significant improvements in its military capabilities since the 1962 war, the threat of a massive attack by China remains. It is crucial for India to not underestimate this threat, ensure adequate defence spending, diversify its military supply sources, and avoid relying too heavily on assumptions of international intervention. The costs of leaving things to chance are prohibitive for New Delhi.

Source- ORF