Context-

China is rapidly expanding and modernising its nuclear arsenal, moving beyond its earlier stance of minimum deterrence. President Xi Jinping’s 2022 pledge to elevate China's armed forces to world-class standards reflects the country's ambitions to increase the size, sophistication, and readiness of its nuclear triad—missiles, submarines, and bombers. This shift, which integrates emerging technologies into China's nuclear force structure, signals a potential change in posture, including the possibility of a "launch-on-warning" (LOW) stance.

Key Developments

1. Hypersonic Weapons

China has made significant advancements in hypersonic weapons, emerging as a global leader in this domain. Beijing has been developing two primary types of hypersonic missiles: hypersonic glide vehicles mounted on ballistic missiles and hypersonic cruise missiles.

●     The DF-ZF hypersonic glide vehicle has been in testing since 2014, with reports indicating that China has developed both conventional and nuclear-armed hypersonic technologies. In 2020, China deployed the DF-17 medium-range ballistic missile (MRBM) equipped with a hypersonic glide vehicle. With a range of 1,800–2,500 km, the DF-17 can carry either conventional or nuclear payloads.

●     In April 2023, intelligence leaks revealed China’s development of a longer-range hypersonic missile, the DF-27, which reportedly has a range of 5,000–8,000 km and can carry nuclear or conventional warheads.

●     China has also developed hypersonic cruise missiles using scramjet technology. The Xingkong-2 (Starry Sky-2), tested in 2018, is believed to have a range of 700–800 km with speeds exceeding Mach 6.

2. Fractional Orbital Bombardment System (FOBS)

●     China tested a Fractional Orbital Bombardment System (FOBS) in August 2021, where a nuclear-capable hypersonic missile was launched into orbit and then deorbited to strike a target. This system, a Cold War-era technology originally developed by the Soviet Union, has been revived and combined with hypersonic glide vehicles to evade missile defense systems. Although prohibited from full orbit by the Outer Space Treaty, FOBS allows China to bypass traditional missile defense systems by launching from unpredictable angles.

3. Increasing Nuclear Arsenal

●     China’s nuclear arsenal is growing at an unprecedented rate. The Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) estimates that China has around 500 nuclear warheads, with projections indicating this number could reach 1,000 by 2030. This increase is accompanied by the construction of approximately 350 missile silos in China’s northwestern desert areas. China’s ICBM inventory is estimated to include around 400 missiles, many equipped with multiple independently targetable reentry vehicles (MIRVs).

●     The country has also been expanding its plutonium production through fast breeder reactors and has resumed construction at its nuclear testing site at Lop Nur. This growth suggests that China is moving beyond minimum deterrence and into a nuclear arms race with the US and Russia.

4. Nuclear Posture Debate

●     China’s nuclear posture appears to be shifting toward a launch-on-warning (LOW) stance. Reports from the US Department of Defense (DoD) indicate that China is adopting an “early warning counterstrike” posture, which would enable it to launch nuclear strikes based on the detection of incoming missiles, even before these missiles hit Chinese territory.

●     China’s increasing alertness is evident in its investment in advanced ground and space-based sensor technology. The Science of Military Strategy (2020) emphasises the need for China’s strategic missile forces to maintain a high state of readiness, arguing that a quick nuclear response is essential for strategic deterrence.

Drivers Behind the Changing Nuclear Profile

1. US Conventional Capabilities

China’s nuclear build-up is largely driven by the perception of an escalating threat from the US. Following the US withdrawal from the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty in 2019, the Pentagon has developed and deployed intermediate-range missiles in the Indo-Pacific. The US has bolstered its conventional military capabilities in the region, including the deployment of land-based Tomahawk and SM-6 missiles, as well as the Typhoon mid-range capability system.

The US military is also advancing its Joint All-Domain Command and Control (JADC2) strategy to enhance its information superiority in cyber, space, and electromagnetic domains. These developments, along with the US’ robust missile defense systems, have raised concerns in China that its second-strike capability could be undermined.

2. Tactical Nuclear Weapons

The potential development of low-yield tactical nuclear weapons by the US is another significant driver of China’s nuclear expansion. While the 2022 US Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) did not explicitly endorse low-yield weapons, previous policy statements have hinted at the possibility. Chinese strategists are concerned that such weapons, combined with missile defenses, could render China’s second-strike capability ineffective.

3. Taiwan Tensions

China’s nuclear expansion is also tied to its ambitions regarding Taiwan. Xi Jinping has repeatedly emphasized his intent to unify Taiwan with mainland China, even by force. The US Taiwan Relations Act of 1979, which provides for US intervention in the event of a Chinese attack on Taiwan, further complicates the strategic calculus for Beijing. China is likely building its nuclear arsenal to deter the US from intervening in a Taiwan conflict, seeking "freedom of action" in its unification campaign.

4. Great Power Status

China’s leadership views the possession of nuclear weapons as essential to its standing as a great power. This belief, rooted in historical Chinese attitudes toward nuclear deterrence, has persisted through the tenures of Mao Zedong, Deng Xiaoping, and subsequent leaders. For Xi Jinping, modernizing China’s nuclear forces is a critical aspect of establishing China as a global power. The PLA Rocket Force, which controls China’s strategic missile forces, is seen as central to the country’s military deterrence and global influence.

Implications for India

●     China’s nuclear expansion poses significant challenges for India. While China has long had a larger nuclear arsenal than India, the current gap is widening rapidly. With around 500 warheads, China far exceeds India’s estimated stockpile. Moreover, India must also consider Pakistan’s nuclear capabilities when planning its own deterrent.

●     Given its no-first-use (NFU) policy, India’s nuclear strategy must focus on ensuring survivability in a first strike. Experts like K. Subrahmanyam have suggested that India should aim for around 500 warheads dispersed across the country to maintain credible deterrence. Additionally, India’s focus on developing ballistic missile submarines (SSBNs) is critical for ensuring a robust second-strike capability.

●     As China’s nuclear posture becomes more aggressive, India may also need to prepare for the possibility of Chinese tactical nuclear weapons. The stability-instability paradox, where nuclear stability at the strategic level increases the likelihood of conventional conflict, suggests that India must enhance its conventional military capabilities in response.

Conclusion

China’s nuclear arsenal is growing both in size and sophistication, driven by threat perceptions from the US and ambitions to assert itself as a global power. While China officially maintains its no-first-use doctrine, the development of hypersonic weapons, MIRVs, and a potential launch-on-warning posture suggests a more aggressive stance. These developments are exacerbating the strategic gap between China and India, raising the risk of nuclear coercion. For India, ensuring a credible second-strike capability and enhancing conventional deterrence will be essential in addressing this evolving threat.

Source- Indian Express/VIF